There are many challenges to international environmental negotiations as part of environmental governance. After 10 hectic days in Nairobi as an observer to the negotiations of a Global Plastics Treaty, I share in this article my thoughts on the three most important challenges of environmental negotiations, giving examples from my experiences there. Of course, these challenges also apply to other environmental governance processes, including the upcoming COP 28 – do watch out for them when you attend this global get-together on climate, or read about the proceedings there!
1. Getting Your Voices Heard
For any stakeholder in international environmental negotiations, be it governments, business, civil society activists, or scientists, it is indispensable but also challenging to get their voices heard and reflected in the formal proceedings. States – large or small, developed or developing, powerful or less powerful – clearly have an advantage here. They are the only officially mandated negotiators. During the sessions, the state delegates simply raise their flag if they want to speak, meaning that they push a button on their table or wave a sign with the country’s name. Each delegate then has 3 minutes for her statement or – if she speaks on behalf of a group of states like the African Group, the Asian Pacific Group, or the European Union – she has 5 minutes. Actually, delegates usually speak as long as they wish since the time limits are hardly enforced, if at all. And they can raise their flag and speak as often as they wish. For observer organizations, the catch-all term for all other stakeholders, it is more difficult. In the sessions, they only get the floor once all state delegates have spoken – and this only if time allows. Typically, no more than 5 observer organizations are given the floor. Moreover, their statements need to be endorsed by at least one state in order to be registered in the meeting report and thus possibly also in the agreement text. Given these circumstances, it does not come as a surprise that many observer organizations pursue other approaches to get their voices heard. One approach that business, civil society, or scientists often practice is to become a member of state delegations and advise them. This influence is then, of course, limited to only one state delegation. For example, at the climate negotiations of COP 27 last year, BP CEO Bernard Looney was listed as a delegate for Mauritania. Conflicts of interests, of course, can arise through this practice. Alternatively, non-state actors raise their concerns, advance their positions, and pursue their interests by lobbying state delegates in the hallways of the negotiation venue whenever possible or during side events that they organize. Of course, business, green activists, and scientists compete here for access to and attention of delegates. Given the informality of this approach, it is impossible to assess on-site who is taking the lead. Typically, business representatives are very organized and have ample resources. Some interests are, however, not represented at all, namely those of future generations and those that would profit from new frameworks, for example, entrepreneurs and civil society. The absence of direct representation for future interests results in decisions that may not favour long-term progress and intergenerational sustainability; rather, negotiations favour the status quo by seeking to “balance” interests even of those actors that actively promote practices that are harmful to people and the planet.
Establishing a 'trustee' for future generations and integrating considerations not only of balancing interests but also balancing past profits and (negative) impacts could help in achieving more sustainable outcomes. In Nairobi, according to the Center for International Environmental Law, out of a total number of more than 1900 delegates, 143 officially represented fossil fuel and chemical company interests, outnumbering the 70 smallest states delegations. In addition, seven state delegations had fossil fuel and chemical company lobbyists as registered delegates among them. Not included in this calculation were plastics manufacturers and consumer good companies most responsible for single-use plastics pollution like Unilever, and Coca-Cola, or textiles manufacturers, another main contributor to plastics waste, so the total number of pro-plastics lobbyists was potentially even greater. At the same time, while this representation of industry interests in Nairobi is staggering, the lobbying of civil society groups becomes more sophisticated as well, albeit with fewer resources. For example, there were also 38 representatives of the Scientists’ Coalition for an Effective Plastics Treaty. But it is still to be lamented that indigenous groups, scientists, and civil society are underrepresented compared to fossil industry interests, as they do represent the interests of the vast majority of the world’s population.
2. Finding Agreement and Being Inclusive While Making Progress
Many observers lament that international environmental negotiations are too slow and lengthy and that their outcome will remain largely ineffective since they lack ambition. This is a legitimate perspective and assessment, especially if one considers that these negotiations are typically dealing with urgent environmental problems. These require measures that are directly implementable, but the lengthy process delays this; in addition, the measures agreed on often fall behind what is needed to address the problem effectively. All international negotiations are struggling with an important challenge that is hard to dissolve satisfactorily, namely to strike the balance between the deeply interlinked overall goals of ambition, agreement, and inclusiveness. International environmental negotiations are slow and lengthy because they need to ensure inclusiveness. Inclusiveness implies that every state delegation and also observers need to have the opportunity to make their voices heard in the formal process. This means, first of all, that all state delegations must have an equal right to speak during the negotiation sessions to make sure that their views can be duly taken into account. If 170 or even more states gather for international environmental negotiations and every delegation can speak several times for three minutes on each agenda item, this simply takes time, even though on average “only” around 50 delegations take the floor. There are provisions to accelerate this process, such as the incentive that states can speak longer if they speak on behalf of a group of states. Yet, this requires that the group of states coordinate. This is again a time-consuming process and often difficult or even impossible, for example, because in the regional groups, interests and positions are too divergent.
There are certainly more options to accelerate the process, for example through streamlining and digitalizing the processes by which states hand in their submissions and make their statements. Likewise, the lacking ambition and effectiveness of the outcomes of many international environmental negotiations can be related to inclusiveness. Global agreements are often said to result in the lowest common denominator, that is, the states that strive for the least ambitious agreement ultimately determine its outcome. In the context of plastic pollution, the lowest common denominator is the improvement of waste management as opposed to more ambitious measures reducing plastic production and thus targeting plastic pollution at its source. Unfortunately, the criticism of the lowest common denominator is often true, although one should not underestimate the pressures during negotiations that social dynamics put on delegations. In the end, many do not want to be seen as laggards or obstructionist. In a way, the lowest common denominator is the best possible outcome given the divergent interests as well as different political and socio-economic conditions in states across the globe. In the context of plastic pollution, this would mean that at least the leakage of plastic waste is minimized to some extent. Without any doubt, this is disappointing or even disastrous from an ecological perspective (and often also from a socio-economic and human health perspective). Yet many developing states do not only claim to struggle regarding the balancing of economic development and social progress with environmental protection. Given their available means, this struggle will often result in a prioritization of development, as has historically also been the case for many industrialized countries. Given this diversity of preferences, why is it so important to find global agreement on environmental issues?
First, partial agreements among only a group of states are unsatisfactory from an environmental perspective. International environmental negotiations tackle global environmental challenges that are transboundary and occur in areas beyond national jurisdiction like oceans or the atmosphere. Hence, they require corresponding global measures.
Second, partial agreements to tackle global environmental challenges are not in the interest even of those states that demand and support or even already took ambitious measures. Limiting environmental pollution or emissions means that current business models or practices are outlawed or become less profitable. Many states see only the negative economic burden resulting from this in the short term. Therefore, limited agreements create problems for pioneering states, since they bear the costs of tackling the problem while the states that do not support the agreement can continue these harmful practices, while nevertheless benefiting from environmental effects of the measures from the other states. In other words, also those states that support ambitious international measures have an interest in including those states that try to water down and weaken any international measures, to create a level playing field for all states and actors. Only then can the ambitious states minimize their (economic) disadvantages from moving forward with more far-reaching measures.
Third, inclusiveness is important because it creates ownership and ensures support for the final outcome of international environmental negotiations. This is in turn important for the implementation of and compliance with international agreements because – apart from very few exceptions – there are no enforcement mechanisms available at the international level, like sanctions or fines.
Fourth, and finally, states insist on this inclusiveness. At the second session of the negotiations of the Global Plastics Treaty, this insistence led to a considerable delay in the negotiations on substantive issues as states extensively discussed the rules of decision-making to safeguard its inclusiveness (and probably also, in order to delay the whole process for political reasons).
In sum, international environmental negotiations are not only about quickly finding the most effective solution to a global environmental challenge. To the same extent, they are about reconciling hugely divergent interests and finding common ground in order to make at least some progress instead of making no progress at all or even worse, moving backward. Not including all states’ perspectives and giving them equal weight might accelerate the process and enable more ambitious outcomes. It might, however, also lead to disadvantages that also affect the overall effectiveness of an agreement. There will always be a trade-off between ambition, agreement, and progress. Hence, the challenge to strike an adequate balance between these three dimensions will remain and be a decisive part of international environmental negotiations to come.
3. Coping with Complexity
International environmental negotiations often address highly complex issues. Negotiations usually only start when scientific evidence suggests that there is indeed an environmental challenge. The assessment of the challenge’s magnitude and its causes is often complex and involves uncertainties or blind spots. As oftentimes, business interests, state preferences, and the environment are at stake simultaneously, this adds social complexity to technical issues.
Even if there is mounting evidence for an environmental challenge and its causes, stakeholders in international environmental negotiations often disagree on the interpretation of data and findings. For example, they often disagree on adequate measures that might be derived from the scientific evidence. The identification of adequate measures often requires a sophisticated understanding of natural, chemical, and biological processes, as well as technologies and other technical expertise. In addition, social systems and actors' preferences also need to be considered.
In the context of plastic pollution, for example, many states demand the regulation of chemicals of concern that are added to plastics and plastic products. There are more than 14,000 chemicals added to plastics and plastic products, of which only a few have been examined for their impacts on the environment and health. Against this background, it is no easy task for delegates to find a way how to regulate chemicals and find compelling arguments for their position against or for the regulation. In such cases, delegations or the negotiation committee as a whole seek advice from experts, draw on existing regulations, and/or delegate discussions on necessary and desirable regulations to expert panels.
Complexity also results from the above-mentioned social realm, as international governance issues may affect many different sectors and thus stakeholders in a given country. This requires the coordination of interests within each country even before the equally complex coordination of interests between states can take place during international environmental negotiations. The national dialogue on addressing plastic waste embodies a dynamic interplay of various stakeholders. Businesses, often driven by economic imperatives, promote the status quo with no or limited responsibility for plastic waste. Civil society groups, advocating for public health and environmental integrity, push for stringent regulations and consumer awareness campaigns.
Environmental organizations emphasize the urgent need for preserving ecosystems, promoting a shift towards a circular economy. These interactions form a complex web, where the actions of one group influence the strategies of others. This is then taken up by varying degrees and with varying resources by the different ministries that are advising the negotiation delegations. In the context of plastic pollution, relevant ministries are those of the economy, of the environment, of health, and of trade. They all need to consult and coordinate and then inform and engage with the ministry of foreign affairs that often leads the negotiations. Here, it is important that the scheduling of the negotiation process, including the publication of relevant and important information and working documents or treaty drafts, leaves sufficient time for all stakeholders to prepare and coordinate. In Nairobi, a number of delegations complained about a lack of time to coordinate nationally before the negotiations started.
Another aspect of complexity is that interests between global businesses and states can amalgamate at international negotiations. This leads to a strengthening of their position even if they are not representative of large groups of people or states. In the case of plastics negotiations, the fossil industry and companies and states whose economies are heavily reliant on oil production are, of course, aligned in their positions. Their primary aim is to advocate for policies that promote their economic interests, such as a focus on recycling and waste management, rather than bans or caps on plastic production that could disrupt the industry and make their current business models obsolete. These countries may push for more lenient regulations on plastics, emphasizing economic ramifications and advocating for solutions that allow the continued use of oil-based products while ostensibly addressing environmental concerns. For many countries present at the negotiation, these interests are not in line with their own needs or concerns, yet they are obliged to consider them regardless as part of the complexity of reaching consensus in global environmental negotiations. At the same time, the global spotlight also brings together companies that are looking for truly circular solutions to the plastics challenge, like the Business Coalition for a Global Plastics Treaty. This can also actively shape the views and perspectives and strategic decisions by businesses. International negotiations, therefore, can become a process with their own internal dynamics, creating momentum around solution finding.
Even without this complexity and dynamism of the very problems that are addressed in international environmental negotiations, it is difficult to digest all the input during and in-between the negotiation sessions. After listening to around 150 statements each day, it is hard to remember individual interests and positions. And this gets harder day by day because statements and issues add up. Those observers that closely follow the negotiations and note down any statement usually work in teams of around eight people to ensure sufficient breaks and concentration and thus accuracy of their notes. Most state delegations are significantly smaller. They also need to know what other states’ positions are. In addition, they need to prepare their statements on every single (and often complex) issue. Here, larger delegations like those from developed countries certainly have an advantage. Other delegations then often rely on information from other actors, like daily briefings of some major non-state actors.
On top of that, negotiations run all day from 8 in the morning until officially 7 in the evening. During the breaks, there are important side events with even more input or important networking activities. Break times become less and shorter the closer the end of the negotiation days comes while sessions last longer into the night, if not all night. So, at the latest after three or four days, many delegates not only struggle with complexity but also with fatigue or even exhaustion, rendering the coping with complexity even more difficult. Here, the only way out is to come with large delegations.
Per-Olof Busch is an Expert for the SWITCH-Asia Policy Support Component. He is also a Senior Researcher at adelphi, a leading and independent think-and-do tank in Europe for climate, environment and development. He leads projects on national and international environmental governance. Currently, his main topics of interest include: plastic pollution, circular economy and the 2030 Agenda. Per-Olof has published studies and provided advice on several topics related to the global agreement on plastic pollution, namely its necessity and possible design; options to mobilise international and domestic financial resources from public and private actors; design features of a global science-policy interface on plastic pollution; economic opportunities for the upstream sector in the plastics life-cycle; and challenges, needs and opportunities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the context of a global plastics agreement. He has also provided inputs to and co-led stakeholder consultations in Asian countries with the aim to identify challenges, opportunities, solutions and common interests in the context of a global plastics agreement.
